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REFORMING HISTORY: TURKEY'S LEGAL 
REGIME AND ITS POTENTIAL ACCESSION 
TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
DINESH D. BANANI* 
Abstract: For the past decade, Turkey and the European Union (EU) 
have had serious discussions about Turkey's possible entrance into the 
EU. The intensity of these talks, however, has always been tempered by 
Turkey's extremely questionable human rights practices. The most 
marked aspects of this record are the country's treatment of the 
Kurdish minority and its quashing of political dissent through the heavy-
handed use of its legal system. In this note, I will argue that, despite 
Turkey's increasing political and economic stature in the world, it will 
not be able to gain entry into the EU until it is able to sufficiently 
address these human rights problems to the satisfaction of the EU and 
the international community in general. 
INTRODUCTION 
The controversy over Turkey's possible accession into the Euro-
pean Union (EU) provides a valuable study in comparing one legal 
construct with another.1 Turkey, like many current members of the 
EU, boasts a democratically elected parliament and a facially inde-
pendent judiciary.2 It is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO), the Council of Europe, the European Commu-
nity (associate member), and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe.3 However, in contrast to its EU counterparts, 
Turkey has received a great deal of international condemnation for its 
human rights practices.4 Critics of these practices point primarily to 
problems in the Turkish legal regime, such as ( 1) the torture of pris-
oners while in detention; (2) the extrajudicial killings of Kurdish na-
* Dinesh D. Banani is an Executive Editor of the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
' See Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsidering the Luxembourg Ex-
clusion, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 606, 606 (2000). 
2 Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political and Cultural Structures of Human Rights Protec-
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tionalists; and (3) denial of due process to persons who fall under the 
jurisdiction of State Security Courts.5 
This Note analyzes the effect that these aspects of Turkey's legal 
regime will have on its ability to gain accession into the EU. Part I dis-
cusses the importance of Turkey in the European Continent and its 
relationship with the EU over the past several years. Part II analyzes 
the political and legal criteria for accession into the EU with respect 
to Turkey and compares these criteria to Turkey's current legal struc-
ture. Part III discusses Turkey's prospects for successfully acceding to 
the EU and the legal reforms the government could take to accelerate 
the accession process. I will conclude that, while Turkey has made 
significant progress in reforming its political and legal regime, certain 
reforms still need to be made if Turkey is to ensure its accession to the 
EU in the near future. 
I. BACKGROUND: TURKEY AND EUROPE 
A. The Importance of Turkey to Europe and the West 
Geographically, Turkey stands at the crossroads between eastern 
Europe, central Asia and the Middle East.6 It is the only NATO mem-
ber state to border Iran, Iraq, Syria, and two former Soviet states. 7 As a 
result, one scholar has stated, "Only Turkey lies either close to or at 
the center of most of the gravest threats to Europe's peace and well-
being."8 
As the region's only modern democracy with a predominantly 
Muslim population, Turkey is also of great strategic importance to 
European governments.9 The founder of Turkey's transition to liberal 
democracy, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, aggressively applied principles of 
secularism and statism to unite multi-ethnic regions of the former Ot-
toman Empire into a westernized nation-state.l0 An important aspect 
of Ataturk's policies was the complete suppression of Islamic religious 
practices by various ethnic minorities and the replacement of the Is-
lamic legal code with a European legal code.ll Furthermore, the 
5 !d. at 439-40. 
6 Hugg, supra note 1, at 614. 
7 Id. at 614-15. 
8 joHN NEWHOUSE, EUROPE ADRIFT 252 (1997), quoted in Hugg, supra note 1, at615. 
9 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 615. 
10 See generally Magnarella, supra note 2, at 440-41 (providing political and legal back-
ground on Ataturk's reforms). 
11 !d. at 442. 
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Turkish military elite viewed themselves as the guardians of these 
westernizing reforms and the new nation-state. 12 The constitution 
gave the military the right and duty to intervene in Turkish politics in 
"the name of the nation. "13 Over the past several decades, the military 
has used this constitutional legitimacy to declare martial law in certain 
regions dominated by Kurdish nationalists, and to deny due process 
and free speech rights to the Kurdish minorities throughout· the 
country.14 
Turkey's ability to maintain a secular democratic state in a region 
of the world with rising Islamic fundamentalism has allowed it to 
maintain very strong connections to Europe and the United States.15 
This eagerness to align with the West is evident today in the Turkish 
people's strong appetite for U.S. foods, films, and music.16 It is also 
evident at the governmental level in Turkey's participation in NATO 
and in the European Community as an associate memberP 
However, Turkey's attempt to maintain national unity by denying 
important legal rights to their Kurdish brethren and other believers 
of the Islamic faith has been a cause of tension between it and the 
EU .18 In the southeastern regions of Turkey, where a vast majority of 
the Kurdish population resides, the government has instituted a state 
of emergency in response to terrorist activity by Kurdish separatist 
movements.19 This state of emergency in the southeast has infused the 
military with immense power over Turkey's Kurdish minority.20 The 
military, strongly imbued with Ataturk's ideal of national unity, has 
used its influence to prohibit radio and television broadcasts in Kurd-
ish.21 It also has interfered with the distribution of Kurdish newspa-
pers.22 
12 !d. at 448. 
13 !d. at 448. 
14 !d. at 440. 
15 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 624. 
16Jd. 
17 Magnarella, supra note 2, at 439. 
18 See Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's 
Progress Towards Accession, SEC (2001)1756, 28 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at 
http:/ I europa.eu.int/ comm/ enlargement/report2001/tu_en.pdf [hereinafter 2001 
Regular Report]. 
19 See U.S. Dep't of State, Turkey Country Report on Human Rights (Feb. 23, 2001), 
available at http:/ /www.state.gov I g! drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/ eur /844.htm [hereinafter State 
Department Report]. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22Jd. 
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Aside from the Kurdish problem, Turkey's ability to maintain a 
secular state has come at the price of severely limiting the religious 
freedoms of its predominantly Islamic population.23 A primary exam-
ple of this limitation is the lack of freedom female university students 
have to wear traditional Muslim head scarf on Turkish campuses.24 
The power of the military in Turkey's domestic policy is also an 
important reason why the country has been unable to undertake insti-
tutional reforms to protect human rights and guarantee the rule of 
law.25 The European Commission concluded in its 2001 Regular Re-
port on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession that Turkey still needs to 
effectively address the issue of the military's role in Turkish politics 
before the state can meet the political criteria for entering the EU.26 
B. Relations Between the EU and Turkey 
Turkey has had a history of cooperation with the European inte-
gration movement since the movement's early beginnings.27 In 1963, 
Turkey and the European Community (EC) signed the Turkey-EC 
Association Agreement.2B This Agreement outlined ways in which the 
EC and Turkey could promote trade with Europe and also achieve the 
necessary political and human rights standards to eventually allow 
Turkey to enter the EC.29 
In 1980, economic difficulties and a military coup halted this 
progression towards European integration when the EC froze its rela-
tions with Turkey.30 These relations were not fully normalized again 
until the return to civilian government in 1983.31 
In 1987, Turkey formally applied for accession to the EC.32 The 
European Commission responded to this application rather nega-
tively, concluding that negotiations for accession should be put on 
hold for economic, political, strategic and cultural reasons.33 Never-
23 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 627. 
24 See generally Phillip G. Smucker, The meaning of a scarf Turkish students fight to wear Is-
lamic head coverings, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Mar. 16, 1998, at 31, 33. 
25 Hugg, supra note 1, at 661. 
26 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 33. 
27 Hugg, supra note 1, at 645. 
28 I d. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 646. 
31 ld. 
32 Hugg, supra note 1, at 646. 
33 See CHRISTOPHER PRESTON, ENLARGEMENT AND INTEGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UN-
ION 215 (Clive Church ed., 1997). 
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theless, the Commission recommended continuing cooperation with 
Turkey, and this cooperation eventually led to the formation of an EU 
customs union with Turkey in 1995.34 
Contrary to Turkey's hopes, the formation of a customs union 
did not necessarily accelerate Turkey's prospective accession into the 
EU.35 The Turkish government's ongoing battle with Greece over the 
status of Cyprus and their questionable human rights practices with 
respect to the Kurdish minority led the European Parliament to slow 
its cooperation with Turkey in September 1996.36 The Parliament re-
acted by passing a resolution to block any EU appropriations to Tur-
key except those fostering democracy, human rights, and civil soci-
ety.37 
In April1997, at the EU Intergovernmental Conference, the EU 
announced that Turkey would remain eligible for accession on the 
same political criteria as other applicant countries.38 The conference 
resulted in "concrete preparations for the enlargement process 
opened with the presentation by the Commission to the Council ... 
of the so called Agenda 2000. "39 
The Luxembourg European Council meetings of 1997 provided 
rather negative signals for Turkey's prospective accession to the EU.40 
The Council's opening statements excluded Turkey from the ten 
other central and east European countries allowed to launch the ap-
plication process designed for accession to the EU.41 Furthermore, 
the Commission argued that Turkey would not yet be allowed to ne-
gotiate for accession, and would need to develop a "special strategy" 
with the EU before serious negotiations could take place.42 
Since the Luxembourg Council, the EU attempted to maintain 
the euphemistic position that Turkey is still very much eligible for ac-
cession, but needs to draw closer to the EU before actual negotiations 
for accession can begin.43 This strategy, known as the Accession Part-
34 Hugg, supra note 1, at 646-647. 
!5 See id. at 647-48. 
!S ld. 
! 7 !d. at 648. 
88 ld. 
! 9 Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty of Amsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreip;n and Security 
Policy Chapter and an Overview of the opening of the Enlargement Process, 22 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 
174, 183-84 (1999), quoted in Hugg, supra note 1, at 648. 
40 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 649. 
41 !d. at 650. 
42 !d. 
4! !d. at 651. 
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nership, concentrates on the required political and economic reforms 
that Turkey would need to make for accession negotiations, and also 
seeks to mobilize all forms of economic and humanitarian aid to Tur-
key within a single framework. 44 The Partnership clearly delineates 
the political criteria that Turkey will have to meet if it is to have any 
hope of gaining accession to the EU in the near future.45 
II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. The EU's Political and Legal Criteria for Turkey's Potential Accession 
The European Council's 1993 meeting in Copenhagen repre-
sented an important step in the EU's relationship with the countries 
of central and eastern Europe.46 Before this meeting, the EU seemed 
to view these countries as "associated countries" of the EU who 
benefited from lowered trade and investment barriers as a result of 
certain agreements between themselves and the EU.47 At the Copen-
hagen Summit, however, the European Council stated that the associ-
ated countries of central and eastern Europe that so desire shall be-
come members of the EU and that accession will take place as soon as 
a country is able to satisfY certain economic and political conditions.48 
This development led to the establishment of the political and legal 
criteria that the applicant countries needed to satisfY to obtain admis-
sion to the EU.49 At the most general level, these criteria stipulated 
that these countries must have achieved stability of institutions guar-
anteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities. 5° 
With respect to Turkey, the Commission's 2001 Regular Report 
on Turkey identified several short-term and medium-term objectives 
necessary for Turkey to satisfY the Copenhagen political criteria.51 
The short-term legal objectives included: (I) strengthening legal and 
constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression in line with Arti-
44 See generally Council Decision 2001/235/EC, Annex, 2000 OJ. (L 85) 15 [hereinaf-
ter Council Decision]. 
45 See generally id. 
46 See GRAHAM AVERY & FRASER CAMERON, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UN-
ION 17 (Clive Archer ed., 1998). 
47 See id. at 16. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 See Hugg, supra note I, at 659. 
5o Id. 
51 Council Decision, supra note 44, at 16. 
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de 10 of the European Convention for Human Rights (ECHR); (2) 
aligning legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the 
provisions of the ECHR; (3) improving the functioning and efficiency 
of the judiciary, including the State Security Courts, in line with in-
ternational standards; ( 4) removing any legal provisions forbidding 
the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in 1V /radio 
broadcasting; and (5) overturning laws allowing for capital punish-
ment.52 
While most of the medium-term objectives laid out by the Com-
mission are similar in nature to many of the short-term objectives, a 
few are more specific: (1) adjusting detention conditions in prisons to 
bring them into line with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners and other international norms; (2) lifting the 
state of emergency in the southeastern regions of Turkey; and (3) en-
suring cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights for all citi-
zens irrespective of their origin.53 In addition to these items, the 
Commission retained serious concerns regarding the role of the mili-
tary in Turkish society and the special role of the National Security 
Council in enforcing the rule of law in Turkey.54 
B. The Turkish Legal Regime and Human Rights 
I. Constitutional Basis of the Turkish Legal Regime 
Unlike many of its neighbors in the Middle East, Turkey is a con-
stitutional democracy.55 Article 2 of the Constitution states that Tur-
key "is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of 
law; bearing in mind the concepts of social peace, national solidarity 
and justice. "56 Furthermore, Article 67 of the Constitution provides 
for elections on the basis of free, equal, secret, direct, and universal 
suffrage, and provides that ballots be counted and sorted in public.57 
Furthermore, elections are governed by the Supreme Board of Elec-
tions, empowered to take all necessary measures to ensure the fair 
and orderly conduct of elections. 58 
52 Id. at 16-17. 
5! Id. at 19. 
54 Hugg, supra note I, at 661. 
55 See Ergun Ozbudun, Chapter 2: Constitutional Law, in INTRODUCTION TO ThRKISH 
LAw 19, 19(Tugrul Ansay & Don Wallace, Jr. eds., 1996). 
56JbRK. CoNST. art. 2, available at http:/ /www.ibb.gov.tr /ibbeng/244/24400/01/. 
57 Id. art. 67. 
ss Id. 
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At the same time, the Turkish Constitution is founded upon 
Ataturk's ideals of an indivisible, unified state that stresses a national-
ist notion ofTurkishness above any other ethnic or religious identity.59 
The preamble of the Turkish constitution states: 
No protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions con-
trary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the exis-
tence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and ter-
ritory, Turkish historical and moral values, or the nation-
alism, principles, reform and modernism of Ataturk, and 
that as required by the principles of secularism, there shall 
be no interference whatsoever of sacred religious feelings in 
state affairs and politics .... 60 
Article 5 repeats this theme of indivisibility by stating: "The funda-
mental aims and duties of the State are: to safeguard the independ-
ence and integrity of the Turkish nation, the indivisibility of the coun-
try, the Republic and democracy .... "61 
Articles 24 through 28 of the Constitution appear to guarantee 
the rights of thought, speech, and press to Turkey's citizens.62 Fur-
thermore, Article 13 of the Constitution states that "[r]estrictions on 
basic rights and liberties shall not conflict with the requirements of 
the democratic social order. "63 This Article enables the judiciary to 
restrict the basic rights and liberties of Turkish citizens in a manner 
that would be unacceptable in most liberal democratic regimes.64 
However, exceptions within these Articles have provided a legal 
basis for the Turkish state to harass, detain, and torture those who 
they believe question the state's uncompromising principles of secu-
larism and Turkish nationalism.65 Article 24, for instance, states that 
education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted 
under state supervision and control.66 Articles 25 and 26 allow for 
freedom of expression and the press, but allow the state to restrict 
these freedoms with regard to anyone who writes or prints any news 
or articles that threaten the internal and external security of the state 
59 See Magnarella, supra note 2, at 446. 
60 TuRK. CONST. at pmbi. 
61 /d. art. 60. 
62 See Magnarella, supra note 2, at 44 7; TuRK. CoNST. arts. 24-28. 
63 TuRK. CoNST. art. 13. 
64 Ozbudun, supra note 55, at 30. 
65 Magnarella, supra note 2, at 447. 
66 TuRK. CoNST. art. 24. 
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or the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation.67 
Article 28 of the Constitution also provides a legal basis for crirninaliz-
ing speech that criticizes government actions.68 
Furthermore, the Constitution establishes a basis for the Turkish 
military to play a key role in enforcing the rule of law and ensuring 
that Ataturk's ideals of Turkish nationalism will quash any forms of 
expression opposed to those ideals.69 Article 118 of the Constitution 
gives the armed forces the duty to protect the "integrity and indivisi-
bility of the country, and the peace and security of society. "70 The 
Turkish military has used this constitutional mandate to erect various 
state security tribunals dealing with political and terrorist charges that 
consist of at least one military judge appointed by the Executive.7l To 
a great extent, these courts usurp the traditional functions of inde-
pendent judicial courts by having members of the executive branch-
specifically, military officers-decide certain judicial proceedings, 
which seem to be of fundamental importance to human and civil 
rights, including the right to freedom of expression, movement, and 
association. 72 
2. Enforcing the Constitution and Human Rights 
The balance between nationalism and individual rights under the 
Turkish Constitution has always tilted towards the former with regards 
to the enforcement of the rule of law.73 This tilt has in many ways led 
to the human rights and due process violations that have made Tur-
key a recipient of considerable international condemnation over the 
past several decades.74 The European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Human Rights Commission, for instance, have seen several 
hundred cases brought before them for violations of the ECHR relat-
ing to Turkey's human rights practices.75 
67 /d. at arts. 25-26. 
68 /d. at art. 228. 
69 See Edip fuksel, Cannibal Democracies, Theocratic Secularism: The Turkish Version, 7 Car-
dozo]. lnt'l & Comp. L. 423,432 (1999); TuRK. CoNsT. art. 118. 
7o TuRK. CoNST. art 118. 
71 See Mark Muller, Nationalism and the Rule of Law in Turkey: The Elimination of Kurdish 
Representation during the 1990, reprinted in THE KuRDISH NATIONALIST MovEMENT IN THE 
1990's: ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST 173, 178 (Robert Olson ed., 1996). 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 43. 
74 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 662. 
75 Id. 
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Furthermore, investigations by the U.S. Department of State pro-
vide convincing evidence of an ongoing disregard for human rights in 
Turkey.76 The State Department's 2000 Country Report on Turkey's 
Human Rights Practices points out how the police and the courts 
have used the restrictions in the 1982 Constitution to take actions 
against those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the 
state.77 These actions may include extrajudicial killings, such as deaths 
due to excessive force, or severe torture under extended periods of 
detention without a hearing.78 Politically, they may also include exces-
sive restrictions on the ability of Muslims to practice their faith, and 
on ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds, to express themselves in their 
own language.79 
Recently, Turkey has made some improvements with respect to 
human rights and its enforcement of the rule of law.80 The govern-
ment has increased the human rights training of law enforcement 
officals.81 The U.N. Special Rapporteur, on his most recent visit to 
Turkey, reported that, while abusive practices continue to occur in 
some parts of Turkey, the situation had improved significantly and did 
not appear to be widespread and systemic.s2 
Nonetheless, the EU Commission, in its 2001 Regular Report, 
implied that there is still a problem with regard to the manner in 
which existing legislation leads to interpretations that violate the 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by the ECHR, and confirmed by 
many judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.83 The 
Commission goes on in the report to recommend an overall reform in 
legislation and practice in this area so that judges and prosecutors 
respect the case law of the European Court.84 
3. State Security Courts, Criminal Procedure, and the Military 
The unique influence of the military in the Turkish state has also 
led the EU to question Turkey's preparedness for meeting the Co-
76 !d. at 665. 
77 State Department Report, supra note 19. 
78 !d. 
79 See id. 
80 See Hugg, supra note 1, at 678-79. 
81 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 21. 
82 Hugg, supra note 1, at 678-79. 
83 See 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 17. 
84 See !d. at 18. 
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penhagen political criteria for accession into the EU.85 The EU's con-
cerns over the influence of the military center around the National 
Security Council, an executive body that deals with matters consid-
ered threatening to national security, and the State Security Courts, 
which adjudicate cases involving subversive activity such as terrorism 
and drug smuggling.86 The National Security Council is chaired by 
the President of the Republic and is made up of the Prime Minister; 
the Chief of the General Staff; the Ministers of National Defence, In-
ternal Mfairs, and Foreign Mfairs; the Commanders of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force; and the general Commander of the gen-
darmerie.87 Its conclusions and recommendations have immense 
influence in the Turkish political process.88 
The special State Security Courts also represent a major problem 
with respect to meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, primarily 
because their special rules of criminal procedure provide for less due 
process protection than a normal Turkish court.89 In the State Secu-
rity Courts, hearings may be closed, counsel may be denied, and de-
tention may be twice as long as in normal investigations.90 All of these 
issues have led the EU to push Turkey either to abolish the State Se-
curity Courts or to harmonize their procedures with other civil and 
criminal courts at the state and federal level and also with the ECHR 
(especially with respect to detention). 91 
Nevertheless, the inherent role of the military in legal affairs 
through the Turkish Constitution would seem to inhibit judicial re-
form with respect to human rights.92 Reforming the procedures and 
composition of the military courts may require constitutional reform; 
as a result, Turkey's prospects for meeting the Copenhagen political 
criteria remain quite remote.93 
85 See Hugg, supra note I, at 666. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 Hugg, supra note 1, at 666. 
91 See Council Decision, supra note 44, at 19. 
92 See Muller, supra note 71, at 178. 
93 See 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 13; see generally Muller, supra note 71, at 
178. 
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III. REMEDIES: TuRKEY's CuRRENT AND FuTURE 
PRosPECTS FOR EU AccESSION 
[Vol. 26:113 
Recent developments with respect to the legal system have moved 
Turkey closer to being able to negotiate with the EU for accession.94 
On March 19, 2001, the Turkish government adopted its National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which provides 
for a wide-ranging agenda of political and economic reform.95 Impor-
tant reforms that were announced in the NPAA have been incorpo-
rated in constitutional amendments, and progress is also being made 
on drafting legislation to enforce these amendments.96 
At the constitutional level, the government adopted a package of 
thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution.97 These amend-
ments address issues such as freedom of thought and expression, the 
prevention of torture, the strengthening of civilian authority, freedom 
of association, and gender equality.98 Furthermore, several amend-
ments are directly related to meeting certain aspects of the Copenha-
gen political criteria for accession to the EU.99 
The European Commission, in its 2001 Regular Report on Tur-
key's Progress toward Accession, has noted that the recent amend-
ments are a significant step towards meeting the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria, strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and limiting capital punishment.l00 In Articles 
13 and 14 of the Constitution, a number of restrictions have been de-
leted, thereby narrowing the grounds for limiting fundamental rights 
and freedoms.I 01 Furthermore, the principle of proportionality has 
been introduced into the Constitution.102 For example, a portion of 
Article 14 now reads: 
No provision of the this Constitution shall be interpreted in 
a manner that grants the State or individuals the right of de-
stroying fundamental rights and freedoms embodied in the 
Constitution, and of staging an activity with the aim of re-
94 See 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 31. 
95 ld. at 8. 
96 Id. at 14. 
97 ld. at 15. 
98 ld. at 14. 
99 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 14. 
100 Id. at 19. 
101 Jd. 
102 ld. 
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stricting rights and freedoms more extensively than is stated 
in the Constitution.l03 
125 
There has also been some reform with respect to the judiciary 
and the State Security Courts. 104 The Turkish government has held 
numerous courses to train judges, prosecutors, and judicial staff in 
EU law and human rights. 105 Also, the government now appoints all 
members of the State Security Court from the civil judiciary instead of 
the military.Io6 
The government has also instituted reforms concerning the role 
and composition of the National Security Council.l07 The number of 
civilian members of the National Security Council has been increased 
from five to nine, while the number of military representatives re-
mains at five. lOS Furthermore, the government is now only required to 
"evaluate" the recommendations of the National Security Council in-
stead of giving them "priority consideration."109 
Despite these reforms, the European Commission notes that if 
Turkey is to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, it still needs to 
create implementing legislation that will provide individuals with a 
real and practical improvement in exercising fundamental free-
doms.ll0 The lack of implementing legislation is evident from the fact 
that, over the past year, the European Court of Human Rights found 
that Turkey has violated provisions of the ECHR in 127 cases. Ill These 
cases related to a wide range of violations of the Convention such as 
freedom of expression, ill treatment by the security forces, and length 
of police custody.ll2 
To remedy these problems, the European Commission continues 
to urge Turkey to take practical steps to meet the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria and subsequently ensure the rule of law and the exercise 
of human rights.ll3 These steps include:(l) making legislative changes 
to the Penal Code so that the death penalty is completely abolished in 
accordance with Protocol 6 to the ECHR; (2) bringing pre-trial deten-
103 !d. 
104 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 16, 19. 
105 !d. at 17. 
106 !d. at 16. 
107 !d. at 19. 
108 !d. 
109 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 19. 
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tion provisions further into line with ECHR standards for offences 
falling under the competence of the State Security Courts; and (3) 
making concrete changes in legislation that would extend the scope 
of freedom of expression so as to give content to the constitutional 
amendments, in particular to reflect changes to the Preamble and 
Articles 13 and 14 ofthe Constitution.11 4 
CoNCLUSION 
Despite the recent reforms, Turkey's short-term prospects for EU 
accession still appear unlikely. The European Commission's 2001 
Regular Report on Turkey's Progress toward Accession states that, al-
though it is beginning to make progress in some areas, Turkey does 
not yet meet the Copenhagen political criteria. The Report, there-
fore, encourages Turkey to intensifY and accelerate the process of re-
form so that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully pro-
tected in law and practice, for all citizens, throughout the country.115 
Of the outstanding problems, the presence of the military in 
Turkish society appears to be the most intractable and the most trou-
blesome.116 An example of this problem is that Turkey has many laws 
prohibiting contentious acts such as torture and indefinite detention, 
but has failed to enforce these laws partially because of fear of repri-
mand from the armed forces. 117 Furthermore, when laws respecting 
human rights have been enforced, they have primarily benefited pri-
vate actors who seek to silence journalists and human rights activists 
who question the activities of the state with respect to the Kurds and 
with respect to civil rights in general.ll8 It therefore appears that "only 
a thorough overhaul of Turkey's army-inspired constitution can put 
an end to such absurdities. "119 
However, lessening the military's influence in Turkish legal af-
fairs is not as simple as it may seem. The military's legitimacy to affect 
the fundamental freedoms of Turkish citizens has come directly from 
Ataturk, who saw the military as a guardian of the Turkish democracy 
and the underpinning ideals of unity and national identity . Under-
mining the Turkish military's legitimacy in legal affairs may, there-
114 2001 Regular Report, supra note 18, at 21-22, 24. 
115 See id. at 33. 
116 See generally ltny are we waiting1, THE EcoNOMIST, june 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 
8142371. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
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fore, require undermining some of the beliefs and ideals of the 
founding father of Turkey. This conclusion has never been one that 
the Turkish state has liked to face, but it is a conclusion it must face if 
it is to gain accession to the EU. 
